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, ourts have recently begun to respond to the
call to provide First Amendment protection for
software, with mixed and ominous results.A debate
has raged over the past several years over whether
or not computer code should be considered
"speech" and therefore be entitled to the full
protection of the FirstAmendment. IAn examination
of important decisions in recent cases attempting
to settle this debate may require a revision of the
basic assumption that the FirstAmendment will offer
effective protection to programs, their authors, and
their users.The expectation itself is reasonable, for
the Constitution is supposed to safeguard even
offensive and dangerous speech, except in dire
circumstances, such as times of national emergency.
Given that courts reviewing restrictions on the
development and distribution of software are
increasingly invoking the FirstAmendment, it should
follow that software will receive strong protection.
Yet, while there have been judicial decisions which
lend credence to the view that the Constitution can
be invoked to protect software,2 subsequent
developments in this area, which I term "the new
software jurisprudence" cast severe doubt on the
ability of the courts to apply the First Amendment
so as to shield software effectively. These
developments include the faults of previous strains
of FirstAmendment analysis and then add more, with
the ironic result that the FirstAmendment may now
be used to justify the suppression of expression
rather than to prohibit such suppression.3 This article
analyzes two cases important to the development
of this new jurisprudence, DVD CCA v. Bunner 4 and
Universal v. Corley,' both of which provide reason to
believe that the First Amendment will not be up to
the task of providing the protection which computer
code deserves.
This article first shows how the application
of a peculiar brand of equity in both cases resulted
in the subordination of the FirstAmendment to the
law of intellectual propertywith the effect of shifting
subtle but important burdens from the plaintiffs to
the defendants.As a consequence of the role played
by equity; the defendants were treated as pirates
rather than as speakers, with predictable results.The
article next shows a comparable shift resulting from
the courts' First Amendment analyses, a shift which
effectively relieved both private plaintiffs and the
government of the burden of justifying the
restrictions on expression which were at issue. In
the wake of Corley and Bunner, the FirstAmendment
defense-much like the "fair use" defense in
copyright-threatens to become a burden to be
borne by the defendant, rather than a considerable
hurdle to be cleared by the regulator of speech.6
versa 1l v.: Coly n
The series of events which would hail Eric
Corley and Andrew Bunner into court began in 1999,
when a Norwegian fifteen year-old named Jon
Johansen posted a program called "DeCSS" 7 on his
website.8 DeCSS was developed by a group calling
itself MoRE (Masters of
Reverse Engineering), of
which Johansen was a
member, which
dedicated itself to I
reverse engineering in
order to make computer
programs usable on m
Linux-based9 operating
systems. 0The dedication
to interoperability can i l
easily be mistaken for
piracy by those who are
unfamiliar with the free
software movement and its commitment to making
source code freely available to all users; this lack of
familiarity quickly led the opponents of DeCSS to
view it as a means to enable online piracy of DVDs,
while its proponents viewed it as a means of allowing
people to make full use of their computers."
Johansen's treatment in subsequent months by
Norwegian authorities demonstrates the radically-
opposed views taken by the friends and enemies of
DeCSS: In January 2000, as he explained while
appearing as a defense witness in the Corleytrial, he
was being prosecuted by the government of Norway
(at the insistence of the Motion Picture Association
of America ("MPAA")) for the development of
DeCSS, and in the following month he received a
Norwegian national student award, also for his role
in DeCSS."2
DeCSS permits the decryption of CSS, the
"Content Scramble System" which moviemakers use
to encrypt DVDs.The true purpose of CSS is itself
the subject of disagreement. The movie studios
contend that they use CSS to prevent DVDs from
being copied and distributed over the Internet
without authorization, 3 while the proponents of
DeCSS maintain that the licensing scheme which
accompanies CSS intends to dictate what hardware
may be used to view rightfully owned DVDs. 14
Functionally, CSS-encrypted DVDs can be played only
on CSS-licensed players. DeCSS allows a DVD to be
input through a DVD player to a computer using a
Windows operating system, and then copies the
decrypted files to the hard drive. According to
Johansen, this was the first step toward developing a
means to play CSS-encrypted DVDs on Linux-based
operating systems because the Linux systems at that
time could not read the filesystem used by DVDs.' 5
Johansen has always insisted that he intended
DeCSS to allow rightful purchasers of DVDs to view
them on the hardware which they happened to own,
so as to render them less dependent on CSS-licensed
players.'6 He claims that he was maintaining a
Windows-based computer solely for the purpose
of playing DVDs, and that he considered it wasteful
to dedicate a computer to this single purpose.
7
Johansen was acquitted on Norwegian criminal
charges in January 2002,'8 and the judgment was
affirmed in the government's appeal in December
2003. 9 The appellate court agreed with the lower
court's holding that he was entitled to develop
DeCSS to play DVDs which he owned. 0 The courts
refused to hold Johansen responsible for the illegal
use of DeCSS by others because they concluded
that his own use was lawful.
N K,
Eric Corley"' publishes a hardcopy journal
entitled "2600:The Hacker Quarterly" as well as an
online version of the journal at www.2600.com. In
November 1999, Corley wrote an article about
DeCSS, which he placed on the 2600 website.2
2
Within the article, he also posted DeCSS in the form
of object code,23 and posted links to other websites
which made DeCSS available. In January 2000 eight
movie studios filed suit against Corley"5 and two other
defendants26 under the anti-trafficking provisions
of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA).1
7
On January 20, 2000, Judge Lewis Kaplan of the
United States District Court for the Southern
District of NewYork issued a preliminary injunction
enjoining the posting of DeCSS by the defendants,
and, after a trial, Judge Kaplan issued a permanent
injunction prohibiting the defendants both from
posting DeCSS and from linking to websites which
posted DeCSS.28 The District Court adapted its
prohibition against linking in accord with First
Amendment evidentiary standards by requiring
clear and convincing evidence that a defendant "(a)
know at the relevant time that the offending
material is on the linked-to site, (b) know that it is
circumvention technology that may not lawfully be
offered, and (c) create or maintain the link for the
purpose of disseminating that technology."
29
On appeal, a panel of the Second Circuit
affirmed the District Court's decision, rejecting
Corley's claims that the DMCA did not apply to his
posting and linking to DeCSS, that the DMCA
violated his First Amendment rights, and that the
DMCA oversteps limits placed on the permissible
length of copyright protection under the Copyright
Clause. The court reasoned that Corley's
interpretation of the DMCA was unjustifiably narrow
and that the injunction thus properly prohibited both
posting and linking to DeCSS, that the DMCA did
not violate his rights under the First Amendment
because it was aimed at the functional rather than
the speech component of DeCSS,3 and that the
copyright clause argument had to be rejected both
because it was raised prematurely and because it
was presented only in a footnote.2 The court
declined to rule on the standard which the District
Court employed in its application of the linking
prohibition.3
Andrew Bunner, like Eric Corley, also posted
DeCSS on a website late in 1999.34 On December
29, 1999, the DVD Copy Control Association (DVD
CCA), an association created by the motion picture
industry to administer CSS licensing, sought an
injunction in Superior Court under the California
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) s against Bunner
and numerous other website operators who
provided access to DeCSS. 6 According to the DVD
CCA, CSS contained trade secrets whose disclosure
was restricted by licensing agreements.17 Based upon
this claim, the DVD CCA then alleged that DeCSS
was the result of unlawful reverse engineering."
According to the DVD CCA, the UTSA prohibits
the use of trade secrets by those who know or
should know that they are "misusing proprietary
confidential information gained through improper
means ' 9 and according to the DVD CCA, Bunner




2000, the trial court
issued a preliminary
injunction enjoining
Bunner and the other
defendants from
Sof "[p]osting, or otherwise
disclosing or distributing,
on their web sites or
elsewhere, the DeCSS
program, the master
keys or algorithms of the Content Scrambling System
('CSS'), or any other information derived from this
proprietary information."' The trial court, however,
refused to enjoin linking to websites which posted
DeCSS and stated that"[n]othing in this Order shall
prohibit discussion, comment, or criticism, so long
(J L4 J
as the proprietary information identified above is
not disclosed or distributed."4
The intermediate appellate court reversed
the trial court's injunction on First Amendment
grounds. 4 Holding that Bunner's "republication" of
DeCSS was "pure speech" entitled to full First
Amendment protection, the court invalidated the
trial court's preliminary injunction as a prior
restraint. 4 Prior restraints, observed the court, can
be upheld only when the interest they serve-such
as national security-is "more fundamental than the
First Amendment itself.'4 The statutory right to
protect trade secrets did not rise to this level, the
court concluded, and thus it struck down the
injunction. 6
The California Supreme Court, in turn,
reversed the Court of Appeal, concluding that the
preliminary injunction did not violate either the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution or
its California counterpart, Article I, Section 2,
Subdivision (a) of the California Constitution.4 The
Court then remanded the case to the Court of
Appeal to determine whether the trial court had
properly issued the injunction under California's
trade secret law.4' In remanding the case the Bunner
court noted that FirstAmendment doctrine required
constitutional fact review, i.e., that appellate courts
were required to undertake independent review of
the factual findings made by the trial court.
On February 27, 2004, the appellate court
reversed the order granting the preliminary
injunction.49 Noting its obligation to engage in an
independent review of the record, the court ruled
essentially that the evidence indicates that by the
time the DVD CCA sought the injunction, "DeCSS
had been so widely distributed that the CSS
technology may have lost
its trade secret status."' 0
Thus, the injunction
burdened more speech
V than necessary to
protect DVD CCA's
t property rights and
served as an unlawful
- prior restraint on
Bunner's free speech
__ rights."'" As the court
noted, "[A] preliminary
injunction cannot be
used to protect a secret
if there is no secret left
to protect." 2 In one important respect, then, the First
Amendment did lead to a victory for Bunner, for
although the basis for the court's reversal was
statutory, the inquiry was conducted in accord with
the requirements of constitutional fact review. 3
Bunner and Corley give the initial impression
of a solid grounding in law, but their underlying
approach is actually rooted in equity, and the
determination that the defendants have "unclean
hands" ultimately dooms their legal arguments. In
Corley, the Second Circuit asserted that the DMCA
was intended to stop "pirates" even before they
could do their dirty work, 4 and the court quoted
with approval the District Court's use of "the strong
right arm of equity" and the effect it would have on
those who failed to understand "that taking what is
not yours and not freely offered to you is stealing."55
The California Supreme Court took a similar stance
in Bunner when it assumed that the trial court had
correctly found that "the creator of DeCSS acquired
these trade secrets by improper means" and that
"Bunner knew or had reason to know that DeCSS
disclosed trade secrets acquired by improper
means." 6 The court appeared to accept quite readily
that Bunner was out to reap "the harvest of those
who have sown.5s7 Likewise, in each case the court's
reluctance to give serious consideration to the claim
that the distribution of DeCSS has true public
significance signals a belief in the moral probity of
the plaintiffs' cases but not the defendants.' 8 This
kind of judgment will come as no surprise to those
familiar with copyright and related areas such as trade
secret, trademark, and patent, in which the
defendant's character is often dispositive.
An early instance of the language of harvest
appears in the famous case International News Service
v.Associated Press,"' and its use is premised on the
belief that copyright and trade secret law represent
a supremely sociable and commercial means of
harmonizing social interests. Dissenters, in this view,
are antisocial pirates who would wrongfully interfere
with the "harvest" of knowledge, by reaping what
they have not sown, and hence disturb the incentives
credited with bringing that harvest about.According
to those who hold this view, the pirates can make
no claim to authorship of the speech at issue, and
hence they are not typically allowed to cloak their
predatory behavior behind the First Amendment.
This was the
view taken most
famously, perhaps, by the
United States Supreme
Court in Harper & Row





Ford's memoirs.6 ' Time o
Magazine had agreed to
purchase from Harper & -5
Row the rights to publish
excerpts from the
memoirs before their
publication in book form, but in the wake of the
article in The Nation, Time withdrew from the
agreement.6 Harper & Row claimed that The Nation
had infringed its copyright, and The Nation insisted




The Court rejected the fair use defense, and
in the process it made two points which are very
significant to cases involving the intersection of
copyright and the First Amendment.64 The first
statement stresses the importance of copyright in
securing freedom of expression via economic
incentives: "In our haste to disseminate news, it
should not be forgotten that the Framers intended
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By
establishing a marketable right to the use of one's
expression, copyright supplies the economic
incentive to create and disseminate ideas. 65 The
second important point made by the court in Harper
is seen in its emphasis on the importance of
rewarding those who contribute to the store of
knowledge in accord with the incentives of the
Copyright Act, those who "provide the seed and
substance" of "the harvest of knowledge."
66
This desire to protect true contributors is
consonant with a real suspicion of those who appear
to be stealing from others.Thus, in Harperthe Court's
early use of the phrase"purloined manuscript"6 7 gives
an extremely strong indication of the outcome of
the case. In a similar vein, both Bunner and Corley
rely on the view in which copyright (and trade secret
law) are the true engines of First Amendment
expression, and in each case the assessment of the
equities provides an unmistakable signal that the First
Amendment defense will be unavailing. Whereas the
metaphors of "piracy" and "squatting" demonstrate
the courts' demonization of defendants, the
metaphor of harvest shows the courts' enduring
admiration for those who create according to
prescribed economic incentives.'
The importance of the equitable
determination handicaps the defendant, for while
equity has a "strong right arm" it does not seem to
have a left arm. Put differently, the inquiry seems
decidedly one-way; in neither Bunner nor Corleydoes
the court inquire into the probity of character of
the plaintiff, perhaps because the right-holder is
presumed to be on the side of the true engine of
FirstAmendment expression.69 In Bunner, in fact, the
court neatly joins its denial of the public character
of Bunner's actions with a discussion of his
supposedly predatory behavior, while simultaneously
reverting to the language of harvest seen in the
earlier cases. 70 According to the court, Bunner's
expressive purpose "does not give [him] a First
Amendment right to appropriat[e] to [himself] the
harvest of those who have sown."' Such a one-sided
approach seems in some respect commanded by the
law of copyright and other areas in intellectual
property, in which injunctions are freely available and
harm easily presumed,72 and it helps to explain the
burdens borne by defendants when the First
Amendment would command that they be placed
on plaintiffs.
The assessment of the defendants'
characters also helps to explain the comparatively
small attention paid to the statutes at issue in the
two cases.The Bunner court assumed that the trial
court had properly issued its injunction under
California law, even though it arguably had not, based
upon the provisions of the UTSA.73 The UTSA
protects trade secrets, and, as the concurring opinion
by Justice Moreno observed, DeCSS was probably
not a secret at the time Bunner "republished" it,
Bunner was not alleged to be the original
misappropriator or to be in privity with any original
misappropriator, and within two months of Bunner's
first posting, "at least 118 Web sites had been
identified that either contained proprietary
information related to CSS or provided links to other
Web sites with such information" 74The information,
in other words, was already public when Bunner first
received it and continued to be so after wide
republication and was thus not capable of protection
under the UTSA.71 The trial court, Justice Moreno
observed, had focused solely on DVD CCA's
expeditious efforts to protect its members' trade
secrets, but under California law the nature of the
plaintiffs' efforts and the question of whether the
alleged trade information was actually secret are two
separate elements of the UTSA.76 In the view of
Justice Moreno, both must be satisfied for there to
be a violation. Yet the court, if it believed him to be
incorrect on this point,
did not explain its
position beyond
indicating that "because
____t a, of the unusual posture of
this case, we follow the
_ lead of the Court of
Appeal and assume as
true the trial court
findings in support of the
preliminary injunction."'78
In Corley, the
Second Circuit showed a comparable lack of interest
in the DMCA, first presenting defendants' arguments
regarding the application of the statute and then
rejecting them summarily.79 These defenses included
a statutory fair use defense,80 a defense based on
the DMCA provision that "[n]othing in this section
shall enlarge or diminish any rights of free speech or
the press for activities using consumer electronics,
telecommunications, or computing products,"'8 and
a defense based on the claim that owners of DVDs
enjoyed the "authority of the copyright owner" to
use DeCSS to decrypt DVDs8 2 The court disposed
of the first argument in four sentences,of the second
in one, and of the third in three.83
The Corleyopinion shows little evidence that
the court considered the application of the DMCA
to DeCSS very carefully. It shows ample signs,
however, that "the strong right arm of equity" made
such an investigation unnecessary. In areas such as
copyright and trademark, it is tempting to ask why
the First Amendment defense does not work, but
the appearance of the FirstAmendment issue in these
settings suggests that the better question is, "Does
the defendant work? Or does she seek to acquire
free what it cost the plaintiffs time and money to
produce?" The First Amendment defense, in other
words, may actually be counterproductive in that it
offers the courts another opportunity to assess the
character of the defendant unfavorably.This appears
T£ CHbiOLO@Y
to be true in both of the DeCSS cases, as the courts
conducted a rather forgiving First Amendment
analysis, from the plaintiffs' point of viewwhile making
clear that the law disapproves of the so-called
illegitimate activities of the defendants.
The opinions in both Bunner and Corley
devote a great deal of attention to the First
Amendment, particularly in comparison to the small
amount which they pay to the statutory issues.Yet
the First Amendment analysis in both cases appears
to reflect the courts' views of the defendants' suspect
purposes, and thus to restate the equitable reasoning.




review on remand, it is




the First Amendment w
makes any difference to
the courts' reasoning. In
addition, although both




expression are constitutional, in each case the very
first step is obviously decisive. The result is an
extremely unsatisfying brand of First Amendment
jurisprudence designed for software, one which gives
the appearance of providing real scrutiny but which
in fact insulates software-related legislation from any
real constitutional scrutiny.
This first step in the courts' First
Amendment analysis involves a determination by the
court of whether the restriction on expression is
content based.This determination is rather complex
and so merits some introductory points.A restriction
which is based on the content of the message calls
for the highest level of scrutiny-strict scrutiny-
which is a very hard standard for the government to
meet. If a measure is deemed not to be content
based, then the restriction will usually be adjudicated
under a lower and less exacting level of scrutiny-
typically the intermediate level of scrutiny 4.In other
words, a court's decision simply to apply the First
Amendment says little about the level of scrutiny to
be applied, and hence provides little indication as to
whether a restriction on expression will be upheld.
The level of scrutiny selected by the court gives a
far better indication of the outcome of the case,
and thus the question of whether a measure is
content based is critical to the First Amendment
analysis to be applied by the court.
What does it mean to say that a restriction
on expression is content based? Unfortunately, while
the answer can be stated simply and intelligibly in a
general way, in practice, a satisfactory answer often
proves more troublesome. In both Bunnerand Corley,
the courts came up with very unsatisfactory answers,
and in both cases the content determination
effectively ended the analysis. By virtue of ruling that
neither restriction at issue8s is content based, both
courts effectively relieved the government of any
burden in sustaining the statutes and turned
intermediate scrutiny into something more like
rational basis scrutiny, the lowest level and the easiest
for the government to meet. 6
The confusing nature of the inquiry as to
whether a measure is content based is highlighted
by the Bunner court's assertion that"[t]he fact that
the preliminary injunction identifies the prohibited
speech by its content does not make it content based."87
-1~ ~ ~ - -
This view reflects a confusion between measures
which are based on the content of expression and
measures based on the viewpoint expressed,88 and
this confusion allows courts to think that a measure
is not content based simply because it does not
discriminate against a particular viewpoint.
Content based restrictions prohibit
expression on the basis of subject matter, and at
their broadest they prohibit discussion of an issue
altogether.8" Content based restrictions are
presumptively unconstitutional and are adjudicated
under strict scrutiny. Viewpoint based restrictions,
while also based on content, are narrower and more
invidious in the sense that they prohibit the
expression of one viewpoint on a subject while
allowing another. They, too, are subject to strict
scrutiny and are treated even more sternly than mere
content based restrictions.The difference between
a content based and a viewpoint based restriction is
a rather fine distinction, so an example might be
helpful on this point.A classic example of a content
based restriction is provided by a measure which
prohibited the solicitation of votes and the
distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet
of a polling place. This measure was invalidated




but because the ban was
targeted at the content 1
of the speech in its
"prohibition of public
discussion of an entire
topic."9' (If the measure
banned support for a
challenger while allowing - e-e--t'-
support for an
incumbent, the b
restriction would be C o§
based on viewpoint, and
would be even more
strongly disfavored.)
If viewpoint discrimination and content
regulation are both subject to strict scrutiny, with
the small difference that viewpoint based regulation
is more strongly disfavored, what difference does
confusion between them make? The answer is that
in failing to observe a distinction, courts may
conclude that if a measure is not viewpoint based,
neither is it content based.This mistake is made at
the highest levels, for although the United States
Supreme Court distinguishes between content and
viewpoint based restrictions, it has also endorsed
the notion that content based regulation signals the
government's disapproval of a particular viewpoint:
"The principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, place,
or manner cases in particular, is whether the
government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.
The government's purpose is the controlling
consideration. 9 2 Additionally, First Amendment
jurisprudence uses the phrases "content based" and
"content neutral" as if they represented opposing
outcomes of the same inquiry; that is, the law deems
that if a restriction is aimed at suppressing expression
on the basis of its content, it is content based, and if
not, it is content neutral. " This use of the phrase
"content neutral," however, implies that suppression
of a message is acceptable as long as the government
suppresses in a neutral rather than discriminatory
fashion, and misleadingly suggests that the only
question in the content inquiry is whether
government is suppressing expression because it
disagrees with the expression.To view the inquiry in
this light is to forget to ask-in addition- whether
the government's measure prohibits expression on
the basis of subject matter, even though it does not
discriminate among viewpoints. If the answer to either
question is yes, then the restriction at issue is content
based.
In both Corleyand Bunnerand particularly in
Bunner, the courts accepted the invitation to ask only
the viewpoint question, concluding that because
I - -' - .~--- n I,
legislative restrictions on DeCSS do not favor one
viewpoint over another, they are content neutral.
The District Court in Corley thus asked (and
answered) only one of the two necessary questions.
The court should have
asked whether the
DMCA was content
based, but instead asked
only whether the
DMCA was viewpoint
based: "That substantial f
interest [of the
government in passing o -t
the DMCA], moreover, is .
unrelated to the I
suppression of particular i
views expressed in means
of gaining access to
protected copyrighted works."" The court should
also have asked whether the government has chosen
to advance its purpose by prohibiting a category of
speech altogether, for such a prohibition would ban
all discussion within the category, even though it did
not seek"the suppression of particular views:" If the
answer to the question is yes, then the measure must
be evaluated under strict scrutiny.
When copyright and trade secret collide
with the FirstAmendment, of course, it is not typically
because government disapproves of a speaker's
message, but because government wishes to protect
that message against misappropriation. Thus, the
restrictions at issue in such cases are unlikely to be
based on viewpoint. They are, however, based on
content.95 Yet, given its misguided belief that a
content based restriction can result only from
government's disagreement with a speaker's message
and a desire to suppress her viewpoint, it is hardly
surprising that the Bunnercourt could conclude that
only "injunctions 'that by their terms distinguish
favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis
of the ideas or views expressed are content based " ' 96
In Bunner, the California Supreme Court, after
claiming to extend First Amendment protection to
computer code, appears to have asked simply
whether the government was engaged in viewpoint
based regulation. Once it concluded that the answer
was no, that the measure was not viewpoint based,
the court showed no concern with whether the
regulation was nevertheless content based. It simply
refused to look at the nature of what was being
suppressed by the UTSA, and in the name of
protecting property rights adopted intermediate
level scrutiny while actually applying an even less
exacting test than intermediate level-something on
the order of rational basis scrutiny, in which any
burden on the government is slight indeed.97
The Bunner court quotes the United States
Supreme Court for the proposition that "[t]rade
secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge ...
"'98 The Bunner court goes on to say that the reason
that trade secret law is held to advance the sharing
of knowledge is that it allows individual inventors to
contract with companies large enough to develop
the inventors' ideas.9 This belief is analogous to the
view that copyright is "the engine of free
expression." 100 Copyright and trade secret law are
thus thought to provide the most effective means
of getting ideas to market, through their reliance on
economic incentives which harmonize the interests
of the producers and distributors of ideas.This belief
that trade secret law promotes the sharing of
knowledge is key to understanding the outcome of
the Bunner case, for it explains the importance which
the court attaches to the allocation of an exclusive
property right under trade secret law. And the
importance of property to the outcome of the case
can hardly be overstated, for although the court
appears to apply a multi-step test in its First
Amendment analysis, the desire to protect property
satisfies each part of the test.
If the focus is on permission to share
knowledge, is a regulation which prohibits the sharing
of knowledge not a clear content based restriction?
In answer to this question, it appears that the





property can be content
based. The injunction
which the trial court
ordered, in the view of




behind protecting trade 6
secrets like the CSS
technology through
injunctive relief is wholly
unrelated to their content."'' Again we see a
confusion between content based and viewpoint
based discrimination, since the court focuses on the
questions of favoritism and censorship:"Because the
preliminary injunction at issue here does 'not involve
government censorship of subject matter or
governmental favoritism among different viewpoints it
is content neutral and not subject to strict
scrutiny"'
02
In addressing the issue in Bunner, the court
claims to apply a three-part analysis: first determining
if the regulation at issue is content based, then
determining if the injunction serves a significant
governmental interest, and finally determining if the
injunction burdens no more speech than is
necessary."3 However, as will be seen, once the first
question is answered in the negative, the court seems
to lose its vigor in applying the rest of this three-
part test.
In its content analysis, the court considered
the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court
in light of the general purposes of trade secret law.
As the court notes, the injunction "identifies the
prohibited speech by its content"' 0 4 Why does the
injunction's direct and necessary reference to the
content of speech not, in the eyes of the court, make
the injunction a content based restriction? The
answer involves two stages. First, the court makes
the seemingly inconsistent statement that "the
injunction does not purport to restrict DVD CCA's
trade secrets based on their expressive content.' 0'5
By this, the court appears to mean that, although
the injunction refers to the content of the speech
to be suppressed, its purpose is not to suppress the
expression of opinions, but to protect a property
right. The court says, "[T]he trial court issued the
injunction to protect DVD CCA's statutorily created
property interest in information-and not to
suppress the content of Bunner's
communications.'
06
The second stage in the determination as
to whether the injunction is content based is to
assess the secondary effects of the law-which the
court refers to as the law's "primary purpose"-
while ignoring the law's primary effect of suppressing
expression. The court asserts that "the injunction's
restrictions on Bunner's speech 'properly are
characterized as incidental to the primary' purpose
of California's trade secret law-which is to promote
and reward innovation and technological
development and maintain commercial ethics.' 0°7 In
other words, although the immediate purpose of the
injunction is to suppress speech on the basis of
content, it is not content based because its ultimate
purpose is to protect a property right in CSS. 08
Having determined that the injunction is
content neutral, the court then proceeds to the next
two steps of the constitutional inquiry: determining
whether the injunction serves a significant
governmental interest and whether it burdens no
more speech than necessary.09 However, as noted
above, the determination that the UTSA and the
supporting injunction were not content based
effectively ends the inquiry in Bunner.While tacitly
adopting an intermediate level of scrutiny to review
a regulation of pure speech,' '"the court's application
of the test consists in the main of reassertions of
the importance of securing property rights.Thus, the
test devised by the Bunner court is notable in part
because it appears to allow the plaintiff to satisfy
three requirements-that the measure is not based
on content, that the governmental interest is
significant, and that the burden on expression is
necessary-simply by showing that the protection
of property is the goal of trade secret law.
According to the court, the government's
interests here are undoubtedly significant because
trade secret law protects investment, allows "the
trade secret owner to reap the fruits of its labor,"'
and "protects the owner's 'moral entitlement to'
these fruits"' 2 The trouble with this assertion lies
in its redundant justification based on property.The
Bunner court held that the UTSA and the supporting
injunction were not content based because their
ultimate purpose was to secure property rights in
information. Now the second part of the test, the
assessment of the importance of the government's
interest, is satisfied on the same ground. This
repetitive use of the
property justification
must lead to the
suspicion that the
supposedly multifaceted n(
test is actually a





of the court's three-part
analysis, determining -
whether or not the
measure "burden[s] no - o s c_
more speech than
necessary to serve these
significant government interests""I is satisfied in a
similar fashion.The injunction passes this test as well,
but not after any searching analysis of either the
injunction or the UTSA. Once again, the court asserts
that the burden on Bunner's speech is incidental,
that the injunction "upholds the standard of
commercial ethics maintained by trade secret law,"
and that the injunction "merely applies this venerable
standard of commercial ethics to a constitutionally
recognized property interest in information.'" 4
"Bunner proffers, and we can think of, no
less restrictive way of protecting an owner's
constitutionally recognized property interest in its
trade secrets." "5Thus ends the inquiry in the oddest
of manners, with the defendant expected to shoulder
a burden of demonstrating the absence of a less
restrictive mode of regulation, a burden that would
ordinarily be imposed on the government under either
intermediate or strict scrutiny.' 6 It is interesting that
the government appeared only as an amicus in
Bunner," 7 the fact that the government did not
appear as a party points to the private nature of the
plaintiffs' actual interests, and it suggests that the
government was not going to be forced to defend
the constitutionality of the statute with any real rigor.
Indeed, Attorney General Lockyer faced only two
questions and responded with general assertions
connecting DeCSS with piracy' 8 Moreover, the court
did not actually subject the California UTSA to any
scrutiny - its analysis of the purpose of trade secret
law is limited to citations to United States Supreme
Court opinions and to law review articles. '9 The
outcome of this inquiry is a somewhat conclusory
assertion that the government has adopted the only
means of preserving the property interest in trade
secrets.There is, the court appears to have reasoned,
no less restrictive means of suppressing speech than
suppressing speech.'
What is the virtually certain result of this
burden-shifting? A precedent which appears to
ensure that so long as a government justifies a
restriction on speech by relating it to the protection
of property, the measure will be invulnerable to First
Amendment challenge even if it has the primary
purpose and effect of suppressing pure speech. Not
only does such a result pose a direct challenge to
the purpose of the First Amendment itself, it also
threatens to turn the FirstAmendment into a device
to justify the suppression of expression.
n d i" I iz!
IfvU 1 N~.
What property is to the Bunner court,
functionality is to the Corley court: a factor used to
satisfy every step of the First Amendment inquiry.
The opinion includes a promising declaration that
computer code clearly merits First Amendment
protection, 2 ' but the promise is belied by the caveat
that functionality deprives software of its quality as
speech: "The DMCA and the posting provision are
applied to DeCSS solely because of its capacity to
instruct a computer to decrypt CSS. That functional
capability is not speech within the meaning of the First
Amendment" ' 2 Functionality serves as the principal
justification of the determination that the challenged
anti-trafficking provisions and the related anti-
circumvention
provisions of the DMCA
are not content based,
and sets the level of
scrutiny at the
intermediate rather than
the strict level. '2 Then it
goes on to satisfy each
element of the test
which the statute must
meet in order to pass
constitutional muster - '
the question of whether
the government's
interest in the restriction is substantial and the
question of whether the measure is narrowly tailored.
As in Bunner, the result is that the level of scrutiny
which is actually applied is very low and defendants
are forced to shoulder a burden which should be
borne by the government.
Of course, it should be remembered that
the court's dim view of the defendants' activities
constitutes an important element in the court's
reasoning. As noted above, neither the District Court
nor the Court of Appeals found it difficult to see
the antisocial forces of piracy at work in the creation
and distribution of DeCSS.' 4 This attitude calls into
question the express goal of the court, which is to
take an "'evolutionary' approach to the task of
tailoring familiar constitutional rules to novel
circumstances," so as to favor"'narrow' holdings that
would permit the law to mature on a 'case-by-case'
basis.'"2 It is not clear that the court was focused
on the issues presented in this case, and the peculiar
First Amendment analysis indicates that the court
was transfixed by the specter of piracy.
I. Applying the First
Amendment
In conducting the constitutional analysis, the
Corley court first "concluded that computer code
conveying information is 'speech' within the meaning
of the First Amendment."'2 6 However, the opinion
signals that it is not going to think seriously about
the nature of DeCSS itself in its cryptic statement
that DeCSS might convey information so as to qualify
for this kind of protection:"Neither the DMCA nor
the posting prohibition is concerned with whatever
capacity DeCSS might have for conveying information
to a human being, and that capacity, as previously
explained, is what arguably creates a speech
component of the decryption code.*" 7 Next the
court considers the scope of protection to be
afforded by determining first whether the restriction
(without actually referring to the DMCA) was
"imposed because of the content of the speech"1
28
In conducting the inquiry into whether the
challenged portions of the DMCA are content based
or content neutral,'29 the court asks "whether the
regulation is 'justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech*""3 This question
is to be answered, according to the court, by assessing
the government's purpose.' Given its insistence that
the guiding factor in the content inquiry is the
government's purpose, it is strange that the court
examines neither the language nor the legislative
history of the DMCA in this section of its opinion.
3 2
Instead, it conducts an inquiry into the nature of
computer code.' As noted above, the result belies
the tone of the introduction, which strongly implies
that computer code is about to be extended very
~~ns-
strong First Amendment protection against the
DMCA's anti-circumvention'34 and anti-trafficking3 '
provisions.'36 In the view of the court, the critical
question is whether code, in addition to having a
speech element, is also functional. 37 The court's
answer to this is yes, because "computer code can
instantly cause a computer to accomplish tasks and
instantly render the results of those tasks available
throughout the world via the Internet"
' 3
As far as the court is concerned, the
functionality of code effectively answers the question
of whether the DMCA is content based.The DMCA
should be upheld as applied to code because it aims
at the functional capacity of code rather than its
speech elements.'39 "These realities of what code is
and what its normal functions are require a First
Amendment analysis that treats code as combining
non-speech and speech elements, i.e., functional and
expressive elements
" 't 40
Given the supposed importance of the
government's purpose in the test adopted by the
Corley court, it is odd that there is little attention
paid to that purpose beyond a conclusory assertion
that neither the DMCA nor the injunction "is
concerned with whatever capacity DeCSS might have
for conveying information to a human being.'1
4'
Instead, the court focuses almost exclusively on the
supposed simplicity of operation of computer
programs. 42 The emphasis is on the potentially vast
effects attributable to a "single click of a mouse:'
effects which lead the court to endorse the view
expressed by the district court that "functionality is
really 'a proxy for effects or harm."11 43
The combination of the speech and the
nonspeech components in computer code, and the
attendant conclusion that neither the DMCA nor
the District Court injunction is content based, lead
the court to adopt an intermediate level of scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny. 4 It does so tacitly when
it announces the test to be applied:
As a content-neutral regulation with
an incidental effect on a speech
component, the regulation must
serve a substantial governmental
interest, the interest must be
unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and the incidental
restriction on speech must not
burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further that
interest. 141
This is the language of intermediate scrutiny, and it
is much milder and much less demanding of the
government than the language of strict scrutiny, which
requires the government to establish that it has a
compelling interest in the restriction and that it has
adopted means narrowly tailored to meet that object.
The intermediate test is far easier for the
government to satisfy, and the adoption of this level
of scrutiny would make it difficult for defendants to
prevail.
Yet the result of the court's analysis in Corley
is a test which is not even intermediate scrutiny, but
a far more forgiving level of scrutiny from the
government's point of view.As with the test used by
the court in Bunner, once a regulation is deemed
content neutral, the test has effectively been
completed.The Corley opinion appears to require
very little justification from the government-much
less than intermediate scrutiny commands. The
opinion does not show signs of any real burdens
imposed on the government, and while the
government appeared as a party, it did not do so
until it intervened at the appellate level; 146 it was
absent from the trial
proceedings and yet
managed to satisfy the
District Court of the
constitutionality of the
SII DMCA.This lack of rigor
, is exemplified by the
court's acceptance of the
government's position in
e every regard without
question. For example,
the court's inquiry into
whether the
government's interest is
substantial boils down to the blunt assertion that
"[t]he Government's interest in preventing
unauthorized access to encrypted material is
unquestionablysubstantia'.'
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Heightened levels of scrutiny command
something more than unquestioning affirmation of
the government's position, and, although the stated
aim of the court is to devise a standard appropriate
to the technology at issue, it is difficult to see how
this can be achieved by accepting the government's
arguments without also scrutinizing them carefully.'48
Indeed,while the Corleycourt claimed to be following
the test first set out in United States v. O'Brien, 49 it is
clear that it applied nothing like the scrutiny
commanded by O'Brien.As justice Kennedy explained
in Turner Broadcasting System v. FC.C., 1°even after a
measure is determined not to be content based,
under O'Brien the burden remains on the
government to show that the challenged restrictive
measure-in that case "must-carry" provisions for
cable television
providers-was passed
in response to a dire
need,'' and that even
after clearing that hurdle
"the Government still
bears the burden of
showing that the remedy d
it has adopted does not
'burden substantially t
more speech than is
necessary to further the
government's legitimate o
interests."" 2 It is evident
that the Corley opinion
fails to make any such
exacting inquiry of the government.5 3
In fact, the functionality justification leads the
court to question the defendants rather than the
government; the DMCA's attempt to prohibit tools
which permit piracy offers another opportunity to
besmirch the defendants' character by tacitly likening
DeCSS to a key which opens the doors to prison
cells:
The DMCA and the posting
prohibition are applied to DeCSS
solely because of its capacity to
instruct a computer to decrypt CSS.
That functional capability is not
speech within the meaning of the
FirstAmendment.The Government
seeks to "justify," both the
application of the DMCA and the
posting prohibition to theAppellants
solely on the basis of the functional
capability of DeCSS to instruct a
computer to decrypt CSS, i.e.,
"without reference'to the content
of the regulated speech." This type
of regulation is therefore content-
neutral, just as would be a restriction
on trafficking in skeleton keys identified
because of their capacity to unlockjail
cells, even though some of the keys
happened to bear a slogan or other
legend that qualified as a speech
component 4
Apparently determined to prevent the
defendants from confusing the public with their
"slogan [s]," the court expects the defendants, rather
than the government, to show that the government
can accomplish its aims through less restrictive
means.155 To this end, the court says that even though
"the prohibition on posting prevents the Appellants
from conveying to others the speech component of
DeCSS, theAppellants have not suggested, much less
shown, any technique for barring them ... that makes
a lesser restriction on the code's speech
component.'"'5 6 Even under an intermediate level of
scrutiny, while the government does not have to
show the narrow tailoring required under strict
scrutiny, it bears the burden of showing that the
restriction at issue does not burden substantially
more speech than necessary to the attainment of
its end. Moreover, the offer to the defendants appears
to have been primarily rhetorical, for apart from the
impermissibly lax standard which it applies here, the
opinion completely ignores the less restrictive
measures which the defendants did make.
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The next sign that the Corleycourt is actually
applying a very low level of scrutiny is that most of
its reasoning on the
nature of code and
DeCSS is generic at best,
and in many instances
purely conjectural,
concerning itself with
code in general rather t
than DeCSS in particular.
The court places great t
weight on the supposed h
ability of DeCSS to
facilitate transmission of
DVDs over the internet,
but little at all to the
character of DeCSS o n t d
itself."' Like the District
Court, the Court of
Appeals justifies its
functionality analysis with references to the terrible
consequences which code makes possible with the
simple click of a button. 9 Yet the evidence presented
at trial does not bear out any assertions regarding
either the ease of use or the instantaneous results
which the court associated with DeCSS.
To begin with, as the defendants noted, the
plaintiffs did not point to a single instance of the use
of DeCSS to make an unlawful copy of a DVD. 160
They pointed to just one instance of lawful copying
which they themselves had commissioned, the results
of which show that the emphasis on the
instantaneous and easy use of DeCSS for unlawful
copying was misplaced.' As a result of its largely
conjectural reasoning on the functionality of DeCSS,
the court fails to ask whether DeCSS has substantial
non-infringing uses-an inquiry commanded by Sony
Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.'62 Indeed, the District
Court sought to distance itself from Sony, indicating
that the DMCA had overruled Sony on the
significance of the substantial non-infringing use.'63
The Court of Appeals was silent on this question,
perhaps fearful that the District Court was incorrect
in its assessment of the effect of the DMCA on a
longstanding Supreme Court precedent. In any event,
whether the DMCA overruled Sony or requires a
different construction of the case, there is no
justification for turning the case on its head; yet that
is what the Second Circuit accomplishes by holding
the purveyors of DeCSS in violation of the DMCA
on the basis of hypothetical infringing uses.
This reversal of the Sony presumptions helps
to explain the court's lack of interest in DeCSS itself,
and its greater interest in conjectural infringing uses.
If this reasoning reflects a correct application of the
DMCA, this sharp change in the contours of
copyright law would itself call for searching scrutiny
of the challenged provisions of the DMCA.
Additionally, if we consider the requirements of the
First Amendment, the level of scrutiny applied to
legislation which changes such presumptions should
be set at a very high level, and the test should be
applied in a meticulous fashion. The level was not
set at the appropriately high level in Corley and the
test was applied in a most forgiving fashion, and the
reason is that the court focused on the functionality
of code only in the abstract.While ruminating about
the supposed functions of code in general, the court
failed to consider the character of DeCSS in
particular.
2. Overbreadth in Reverse -
O'Brien or Brandenberg
Analysis?
In traditional FirstAmendment analysis there
is a doctrine of overbreadth, according to which the
court holds the government accountable not only
for the application of a restriction on expression to
the defendant, but also to imagined parties whose
FirstAmendment rights might be threatened by the
statute. 164 The result of the application of the
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overbreadth doctrine is that, even though the
defendant in a particular case might not have a viable
First Amendment defense of her own expression,
the possible threat to the legitimate FirstAmendment
rights of others will be enough to invalidate the
government's restriction.
One of the most troubling features of the
reasoning in Corley, in keeping with its tacit rejection
of the rule from Sony, is that it reverses the
overbreadth doctrine.The result is that a defendant's
expression, although deserving in itself of First
Amendment protection, may be suppressed on the
basis of conjectural unprotected uses made of her
expression by others. In other words, although
Corley has himself engaged only in protected
expression, according to the court, the First
Amendment permits the DMCA to restrict him
because of the uses to which others may put his
speech.This is what the court is actually saying when
it explains that the policy choice which the law now
faces is "either [to] tolerate some impairment of
communication in order to permit Congress to
prohibit decryption that may lawfully be prevented,
or [to] tolerate some decryption in order to avoid
some impairment of communication."' 65 While the
court in Corley describes resolution of this dilemma
as a policy choice to be faced by Congress, it does
not explain adequately why communication may be
impaired under the First Amendment on the basis
of the uses to which it may be put.
The key to understanding the court's
reasoning in this regard may be found in comparing
its analysis of DeCSS with the analysis in United States
V. O'Brien, 166 a case frequently employed in the
determination of content neutrality and emphasized
repeatedly by both the District Court and the Court
ofAppeals in Corley.
O'Brien burned his draft card in public
in 1966 in protest against theVietnam War. 6 7 He was
arrested for violation of a 1965 amendment to the
Secret ServiceAct which prohibited the destruction
of registration certificates-better known as draft
cards used in conjunction with the draft.'68 The
Supreme Court of the
United States upheld
O'Brien's conviction and
enunciated a test which





u scrutiny, on the basis that
the government was not
attempting to suppress
O'Brien's expression of
opinion on the war, but
his conduct.'69 This
conduct included the destruction of government
property and tended to interfere with the
government's ability to conduct the war.7
The Corleycourt claims a strong resemblance
between O'Brien's conduct and the functionality of
code.'7 ' That is why it endorses the District Court's
formulation that "functionality is really a proxy for
effects or harm " '72 It is very clear that in attempting
to show that DeCSS has a nonspeech component
equivalent to O'Brien's conduct-the act of burning
his draft card-the Corleyopinion is imputing to the
purveyors of DeCSS unlawful acts which might be
engaged in by others who receive the code. The
possibility of instantaneous online transmission led
the court to impose a prophylactic rule-indeed, this
was the way the District Court opinion described
the DMCA based on the belief that"the only rational
assumption is that once a computer program capable
of bypassing such an access control system is
disseminated, it will be used " '73 It may be that the
DMCA standing alone intends such a prophylactic
effect, but it is clear that the First Amendment is
supposed to have a similar effect in favor of
expression even when it may lead to undesirable
and perhaps unlawful consequences. Indeed, it seems
clear that the First Amendment is here being used
to justify the imposition of contributory liability on
speakers.
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Despite a resemblance between the
situations presented in O'Brien and in the
dissemination of DeCSS, the conclusions drawn by
the Corley court in this regard are not justifiable.
The Supreme Court rejected O'Brien's argument
that burning his draft card was fully protected
"symbolic speech," but it did so on the basis of his
own conduct and the effect it had on government
property, as well as on the government's ability to
administer the draft. His conviction was not sustained
because of the effects which his conduct might have
on others. In fact, if the reason for his arrest had
actually been the danger that he might persuade
others to join him, the restriction on his expression
would clearly be content based and the case would
call for adjudication under another standard.
That standard was elucidated in 1969, just
one year after the O'Brien decision, in Brandenburg v.
Ohio 74 This case supplies the test for advocacy of
illegal action, and it allows the suppression of
advocacy of violent or
illegal action only"where
such advocacy is
directed to inciting or
producing imminent t
lawless action and is
likely to incite or w
produce such action.'  t .b d
The question of
causation in Brandenburg
and in Corley is treated
in a similar fashion, with
both courts asking
whether the speech
which the legislature w
seeks to restrict will
actually lead to illegal
action, will do so imminently, and is intended by the
speaker to do so. Regardless of any tendency which
the speech may have to bring about the illegal results,
all three elements must be satisfied in order for the
speech to be prohibited in accord with the First
Amendment. The danger is that the message itself
will induce and enable its recipients to break the
law, and this is the danger to which the Corleycourt
repeatedly refers in its passages on the functionality
of code.
The Court of Appeals quotes the District
Court on the need to link causation to "practical
policy judgments," which in this case require
recognition that "dissemination itself carries very
substantial risk of imminent harm."I76 It is also clear
that it is the content of the message which threatens
the harms, and that restrictions under this line of
analysis are content based.This much is clear from
the court's unpersuasive attempt to distinguish
DeCSS from cookbooks and blueprints-which it
concedes merit full First Amendment protection.
According to the court, the difference is that
cookbooks and blueprints require understanding on
the part of the user, whereas computer code can be
used without exercising any judgment or
understanding at all.The user of software, in the view
of the court, can be completely ignorant and
accomplish terrible things just by following mindless
instructions. 77
To agree with this reasoning requires us to
forget that cookbooks do indeed have instructions
which can be followed by those who know nothing
about cooking, and it may require more expertise
to install even an executable program than to follow
a recipe.The successful use of DeCSS as even one
step in the process of pirating a DVD, as the plaintiffs'
own evidence shows, requires much more than the
level of sophistication needed to bake a cake.Why
are cookbooks and blueprints afforded the full
measure of First Amendment protection, while
DeCSS is not? The real answer is because their
content does not offend.
Indeed, DeCSS might have provided a perfect
test case for the proposition regarding the difference
between a cookbook and DeCSS: could any of the
judges in either Bunneror Corleyactually have installed
and used DeCSS to create a copy of a DVD? The
suspicion must be raised that the judges would find
that operating the program required more than a
"momentary intercession of human action" between
receipt of the program and its use, and the results
might even have been fairly amusing.
However, we will never know the answer
to this question because the Corley court accepted
the contention that "functionality is really 'a proxy
for effects or harm,"' and it approved imposing
liability so as to avoid any actual harm. 78 Looking far
afield from Eric Corley and DeCSS itself, the court's
ruling was based on the existence of "far too many
who .. .will bypass security measures."'179 The
distinction pertinent to the Second Circuit's
treatment of DeCSS is based rather on the
imminence of the illegal action, which is another way
of saying it is based on the effectiveness of the
speech.80 All of which suggests that the court goes
awry in the inquiry regarding content because it is,
in fact, applying an entirely different test.
In the emerging area of software
jurisprudence based on the First Amendment,
although the idea of First Amendment protection
for computer code sounds desirable, in practice it is
turning out to be uncertain at best.The decisions in
Bunner and Corley serve as evidence that the First
Amendment will not prove a reliable protector of
code and those who use it. These cases illustrate
the deficiencies which already existed in First
Amendment jurisprudence and then add to them.
The outcome of an attempt to determine whether
a restriction on expression is content based was
already an uncertain one to predict, and thus
destructive of expression, but now the First
Amendment threatens freedom of expression in
several new ways.
If the reasoning in Bunnerand Corleyis widely
adopted, a restriction intended to protect property,
no matter how directly it targets pure speech, will
be rendered virtually immune to First Amendment
challenge. In addition, restrictions on speech will be
deemed content neutral as long as they target the
functionality of speech, no matter how pretextual
the targeting. Further, both cases encourage the
ostensible use of intermediate scrutiny while
engaging in something approaching rational basis
scrutiny.
In the end, the Bunner and Corley decisions
will have the effect of suppressing both the content
and expressive capacity of code, while maintaining
the myth that American law will not tolerate the
suppression of the content of speech. The First
Amendment is supposed to offer protection even
to unpopular and dangerous speech, except in very
rare circumstances, such as time of war or other
national emergency, but the nature of the 'national
emergency' which justifies the suppression of DeCSS
is quite unclear. The readiness of courts to allow
restrictions to be placed on software suggests that
the private property interests of copyright and other
intellectual property holders have been allowed, as
a matter of law, to create a continuing national
emergency which may be addressed by any means-
including the suppression of expression.
It is also evident that the legal revolution
which will be required in order to maintain this state
of emergency will face the stiffest of challenges from
the free software movement. DeCSS represents only
the tip of an iceberg which has thus far escaped real
notice by the law, but the movement is becoming so
important that it will force itself to be recognized.A
full investigation of the importance of this
phenomenon lies well beyond the scope of this
article; for the moment it must suffice to note that
the character of open source software and the
people who produce it will challenge the legal and
economic assumptions at the heart of the area of
law now known as intellectual property. Free
software is not the product of pirates who steal from
others and vend their wares in dark corners. Nor is
it brought about by the incentives which, according
to conventional thinking, are necessary conditions
to creativity.The creation of free software, moreover,
is an expressive activity which will make a
tremendous impact on the law.
As time goes on, the free software
programmers will require a revision of the now
familiar role of equity in copyright and trade secret
law. The high quality of the software they create,
coupled with its truly democratic rights of access,
will provide the most telling challenge to the notion
that only monopolistic economic incentives can lead
to creative excellence. Finally, as their favorite mode
of expression works a revolution not only in the
way we communicate but in our very conception of
property, they will work fundamental changes in the
way in which the law links expression and action.
Unfortunately, it is not clear that the First
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Amendment will help them in their work. Indeed,
the new software jurisprudence which is being
developed by the courts threatens to do the
opposite, with its unwarranted brand of First
Amendment analysis deceptively offering the
coverage of the FirstAmendment to software while
declining to extend real protection.The courts are
raising hopes by appealing to a deeply-held belief in
the constitutional protection of free speech, and at
the same time dashing those hopes by engaging in
an analysis which will predictably uphold restrictions
on speech.
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DeCSS and the nature of the free software movement which
spawned it. For an excellent account of the importance of
the free software movement and the difficulties inherent in
according copyright protection to software, see Eben Moglen,
Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of
Copyrigh, available at http://emogen.law.columbia.edu/
mypubs/anarchism.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2004). Moglen
argues that copyright actually creates an incentive to
produce inferior software, and he cites impressive evidence
that free software is superior to the proprietary variety.This
belief alone aids greatly in understanding how the courts are
unable to understand DeCSS as giving rise to anything other
than online theft, given their adherence to the view that
copyright "is the engine of free expression." See text
accompanying notes 64-68, infra, for fuller treatment of the
supposed relationship between copyright and the
furtherance of free expression.
2As Johansen explained:
A. I had to go to the local prosecutor's
office because of charges filed by the
MPAA in Norway, and in February I
received an award, a national student
award which is awarded to students who
are in high school and have achieved
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excellent grades and also achieved
something outside of school in culture,
sports, art.
Q. Why did you receive that award?
A. I believe I received the prize because
of my part in the writing DeCSS."
Q. Did you get a prize?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Did you get any money?
A. I received about $2,000.
Q. What did you do with the money?
A. I used $1200 and bought a high-end
Sony DVD player for my TV
Transcript of Trial - Day 4 at 627-28, Universal City Studios,
Inc. v. Reimerdes, I I I F.Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00
Civ. 277) available at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/
MPAADVDcases/20000720_nytrial transcript.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2004).
3 Reimerdes, I I I F.Supp.2d at 309- 10.
14 The Preliminary Statement of the Defendants'
Reply Brief in Reimerdes argues:
CSS is irrelevant to commercial
piracy. Instead, for example, it prevents
consumers who have purchased DVDs -
that is, paid the requisite royalties and
received authorization to play and view
the movie on the DVD - from, among
other things: (I) playing a DVD on any
DVD Player (hardware, i.e., home player,
or software or computer-based player)
that is not made by a manufacturer that
has licensed CSS; (2) playing a DVD
bought in any other of the seven (7)
geographic regions into which the DVD
consortium has broken the world other
than the region in which she bought her
DVD; and (3) skipping commercials at the
start of a DVD if its maker decides you
must view them. CSS also completely
prohibits the possibility of making fair use
of any material on a DVD.
Brief Submitted by Media Defendant 2600 Enterprises, Inc.,
Reimerdes (No.00 Civ. 277), available at http://www.eff.org/
Legal/Cases/MPAADVDcases/
20000503_ny.def linking_reply.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2004).
1 'This was the Universal Disk Format (UDF) filesystem.The
Linux kernel now supports UDF:"Finally, the new [Linux]
kernel adds support for reading the UDF filesystem used by
DVD diskettes and some CD-RW diskettes." Bill McCarty,
TheAge of24:A Peek at Whats New in the Latest Linux Kernel,
LINUX MAGAZINE, Jan. 2000, at 7, at http://www.linux-mag.com/
2000-01/linux2-4_07.html (last visited Feb. 18,2004).
6Transcript ofTrial - Day 4 at 623, Reimerdes, (No. 00 Civ.
277), available at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/
MPAA DVDcases/20000720_nytrial transcript.html (last
visited Feb. 18, 2004).
17Id. at 620.
8"[Tjhe court has concluded that applying DeCSS to movies
which have not been illegally produced or acquired, does not
represent a violation of the penal code section 145 second
paragraph." Sunde v.Johansen, Oslo First Instance Court, Jan.
7,2003, No. 02-507 M/94 (Jon Bing trans.), at http://
www.eff.org/IP/Video/DeCSS prosecutions/
JohansenDeCSS case/20030 O9johansen decision.html
(last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
"Robin Gross, "DVD-Jon " Defeats Hollywood Consumer Rights
Upheld in Norway, Dec. 22, 2003, at http://www.ipjustice.org/
mediareleases/ I 22203.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2004).
2°The lower court's reasoning is summarized in the abstract
of the translated opinion:
The court found first that access to
movies legally purchased was not unlawful
with respect to the penal code section
145 second paragraph even if the movies
were viewed in a different way than
presumed by the producer. Second, the
court found that disclosure of encryption
keys by itself did not constitute
unauthorized access to data.The indicted
could neither be convicted for
contributory crime to the possible
unauthorized access by others to DVD
moves because the program also had a
legal application.
Sunde v.Johansen, Oslo First Instance Court, Jan. 7, 2003, No.
02-507 M/94 lJon Bing trans.), at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/
DeCSS prosecutions/JohansenDeCSScase/
20030109_johansen decision.html (last visited Feb. 18,
2004).
21 "Defendant Eric Corley is viewed as a leader of the
computer hacker community and goes by the name
Emmanuel Goldstein, after the leader of the underground in
George Orwell's classic, 1984." Reimerdes, I I I F. Supp.2d at
308.
22 Id. at 309.
23A distinction is frequently drawn between source code and
object code, with source code considered as a preliminary
and textual version of a program which can be read by
humans, while object code is viewed as a subsequent
representation of a program which can be read directly by
machines. Object code consists of machine readable strings
of I s and Os which can transmit information directly to a
computer. See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 438-49 (200 1). Scientists are increasingly critical of the
distinction, both because it minimizes the extent to which
object code-which can be read by humans, albeit with
greater difficulty than source code-is expressive, and
because the distinction is based on a programming model
which is becoming obsolete. For an expression of criticism of
the distinction by a scientist who has himself felt the sting of
the DMCA, see Edward Felten, Source Code and Object Code,
Sept. 4, 2002, at http://www.freedom-to-tinker.com/archives/
000035.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2004).
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2
4 Reimerdes, I I I F. Supp.2d at 312.
25 Id.
26 The other two defendants entered into consent decrees
with the plaintiffs, and the plaintiff studios amended the
complaint to add 2600 Enterprises, Inc. as a defendant. Id. at
312 n.91.
2717 U.S.C. §§ 1201 (a)(2), 1201 (b)(I) (2003).The closely-
related anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA can be
found at 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(I)(A) (2003).
28 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429,441 (2d
Cir. 200 1).
29 Id. at 456.
30 Id. at 443-44.
" Id. at 449-55.
1 Id. at 444-46.
" "[W]e see no need on this appeal to determine whether a
test as rigorous as Judge Kaplan's is required to respond to
First Amendment objections to the linking provision of the
injunction that he issued." Id. at 457.
1 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d I, 7 (Cal. 2003).
15 CAL. CIv. CODE § 3426.1 et seq (2003).
1 Bunner, 75 P.3d at 8.
17As the Bunner court noted:
The motion picture, computer, and
consumer electronics industries decided
to use the CSS technology to encrypt
copyrighted content on DVD's and agreed
that this content should not be subject to
unauthorized (i) copying or (ii)
transmission, including making the
content available over the Internet. To
this end, they began licensing the
technology in October 1996. Under the
terms of the licensing agreement,
licensees had to maintain the
confidentiality of proprietary information
embodied in the CSS technology,
including the "master keys" and
algorithms.The agreement also contained
other terms and conditions designed to
ensure the confidentiality of this
proprietary information.
Bunner,75 P.3d at 7.
"'As the court explained:
Despite these efforts to safeguard the
CSS technology, Jon Johansen, a
Norwegian resident, acquired the
proprietary information embodied in the
technology-including the master keys
and algorithms-by reverse engineering
software created by a licensee, Xing
Technology Corporation (Xing). Xing's
software is licensed to users under a
license agreement, which specifically
prohibits reverse engineering. Using the
proprietary information culled from this
software, Johansen wrote a program
called DeCSS that decrypts movies
stored on DVD's and enables users to
copy and distribute these movies.
According to DVD CCA, DeCSS
'embodies, uses, and/or is a substantial
derivation of confidential proprietary
information' found in the CSS technology.
Id.
39 See DVD Copy Control Association Complaint for
Injunctive Relief for Misappropriation of Trade Secrets,
Declaration 49, DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. McLaughlin
(Santa Clara Superior Court, Dec. 28, 1999), at http://
www.eff.org/IPiVideo/DVDCCA case/19991228-
complaint.html (last visited Feb. 18,2004).
4°According to the complaint, Bunner knew or should have
known because, among other things, websites posting DeCSS
contained information indicating knowledge that DeCSS had
been procured via improper means. See id. Declarations 49-
50.
41 Bunner,75 P.3d at8.
4
1 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 338,
344 (Cal.App. 200 1).
4 id. at 350.
44d.
41 Id. at 35 1.
4
6 Id.
417 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2003).
In an attempt to minimize the breadth of its holding, the
California Supreme Court stressed the limited scope of its
decision:"Our decision today is quite limited.We merely hold
that the preliminary injunction does not violate the free
speech clauses of the United States and California
Constitutions, assuming the trial court properly issued the
injunction under California's trade secret law." Id. at 19. In
this regard the court noted that Bunner had challenged only
the injunction and not the California UTSA itself:"Bunner
does not challenge the constitutionality of California's trade
secret statutes" Id. at I I n.6.While the court might thus
have sought to immunize itself against the charge that it did
not scrutinize the statute adequately, the opening sentence of
the opinion signals the court's desire to grapple with the
large constitutional issue, a desire not consistent with
assertions about the limited nature of the decision: "Today
we resolve an apparent conflict between California's trade
secret law (Civ.Code, § 3426 et seq.) and the free speech
clauses of the United States and California Constitutions." Id.
at 6.
Further, it is important to note the court's
declaration that owing to the "unusual procedural posture of
this case, we follow the lead of the Court of Appeal and
assume as true the trial court findings in support of the
preliminary injunction." Id. at 9.This language is puzzling in
light of the court's holding that the trial court's findings were
subject to constitutional fact review, i.e., independent
appellate review, id. at 20, and that on remand the appellate
court would be required to review the trial court's factual
findings de novo.As Justice Moreno noted in concurrence,
under the doctrine of constitutional fact review the Supreme
Court could have, and thus should have, resolved the factual
issues against the DVD CCA:"Undertaking independent
review, I conclude, as a matter of law, that there is no
likelihood that the DVD CCA would prevail on the merits.
There is therefore no need to remand to the Court of
Appeal for further proceedings.The unnecessary delay in
resolving this litigation can only further burden speech
protected by the First Amendment." Id. at 26.The "limited"
character of the court's holding, and the fact that it was
issued only in connection with a preliminary injunction,
should not obscure the fact that the court avoided the
statutory issue in order to reach the constitutional issue, in
the process fashioning an unfortunate prescription for
deciding whether a restriction on expression violates the
First Amendment. In addition, while the court properly
instructed the appellate court to engage in constitutional fact
review, that does not excuse the court's failure to vindicate
Bunner's FirstAmendment rights directly and expeditiously.
481Id. at 17 n.8.
49 Subsequent opinion following remand, DVD Copy Control
Ass'n Inc. v. Bunner, 2004 WL 362414 (Cal.App., 6"h
Dist.2004) (Feb. 27, 2004), available at http://www.eff.org/IP/
Video/DVDCCAcase (last visited Feb. 29,2004). DVD CCA
had moved to dismiss the case without prejudice. Bunner
opposed the motion and the court ruled in his favor. Id. at 2
n.2.
0 /d. at 15.
11 Id. at 16.
21 d. at 14.
531 d. at 9.
1
4 ,"Fearful that the ease with which pirates could copy and
distribute a copyrightable work in digital form was
overwhelming the capacity of conventional copyright
enforcement to find and enjoin unlawfully copied material,
Congress sought to combat copyright piracy in its earlier
stages, before the work was even copied." Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 429, 435 (2d Cir. 200 1).
11 Id. at 442-43. See also Universal v. Reimerdes, I I I FSupp.2d
294, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
"' Bunner, 75 R3d at 10.
57 Id. at 14.
51 In Corley this denial took the form of discrediting the
defendants' contention that the primary purpose of DeCSS
was to allow DVDs to be played on multiple platforms, Linux-
based platforms among them. Universal City Studios, Inc. v.
Corley, 273 E3d 429, 444 n. 15 (2d Cir. 200 1). Thus the court
rejected the claim that because DeCSS permitted rightful
owners of DVDs to play them on computers, defendants
were justified in their decryption under Sec. 1201 (a)(3)(A)
as having the permission of the copyright holder to decrypt.
Even if they had that authority, according to the court, "[t]hey
would still be vulnerable to liability under subsection
1201 (a)(2)(C), because they'marketed' DeCSS for the
copying of DVDs, not just for the playing of DVDs on
multiple platforms." Id.
11 248 U.S. 215, 239-40 (1918).
60 Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
61 Id. at 542.
62 d.
63 Id. at 543-44.
64 d. at 558.
65 Id. (emphasis added).
66"We agree with the Court of Appeals that copyright is
intended to increase and not to impede the harvest of
knowledge. But we believe the Second Circuit gave
insufficient deference to the scheme established by the
Copyright Act for fostering the original works that provide
the seed and substance of this harvest." Id. at 546. "The
rights conferred by copyright are designed to assure
contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their
labors." Id. at 545-46.
67 "Working directly from the purloined manuscript, an editor
of The Nation produced a short piece entitled 'The Ford
Memoirs - Behind the Nixon Pardon" The piece was timed
to 'scoop' an article scheduled shortly to appear in Time
Magazine." Id. at 542. "The trial court found that The Nation
knowingly exploited a purloined manuscript." Id. at 562.
68This view is expressed more fully in David Ladd, The Harm
of the Concept of Harm in Copyright Law, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y
U.S.A. 421 (1983).
19The plaintiffs are not formally excused from the
requirement that the plaintiff must come to a court of equity
"with clean hands:' but in Corley, Bunner, and a considerable
number of other cases, there is an inordinate concern with
whether the defendants have clean hands. No comparable
attention is paid to the plaintiffs' hygiene.
70 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d I, 14 (Cal.
2003).
71 Id. (quoting San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United
States Olympic Comm. 483 U.S. 522, 541 (1987)) (quoting
International News Serv. v.Associated Press 248 U.S. 215,
239-40 (1918)).
72 See MarkA. Lemley & EugeneVolokh, Freedom of Speech
and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases,48 DUKE LJ. 147
(1998).
71 Bunner, 75 R3d at 26-28 (Moreno,J., concurring).
74 Id. at 27.
71 Id at 27-28.
76 /d
7 Justice Moreno allowed that information posted on the
internet might retain its trade secret status, but the plaintiff
would carry the burden to show that the posting had not
permanently committed the information to the public
domain, and in this case "nothing in the record indicates that
the DVD CCA met that burden." Id. at 28.
78 1d. at 9.
79 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F3d 429, 443-44
(2d Cir. 2001).
80 This defense was based on 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c)(I).
8, 17 U.S.C.§ 1201(c)(4) (2003).
12 § 1201 (a)(3)(A).
"3 Corley, 273 F3d at 443-44.
"Strict scrutiny requires the government to establish that it
has a compelling interest in the restriction and that it has
adopted means narrowly tailored to meet that object.
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government's interest
be substantial and that the restriction not burden
substantially more speech than necessary. Intermediate
scrutiny is much milder and much less demanding of the
government than is strict scrutiny: "Content-based
restrictions are permissible only if they serve compelling
state interests and do so by the least restrictive means
available. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,
492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989).A
content-neutral restriction is permissible if it serves a
substantial governmental interest, the interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression, and the regulation is
narrowly tailored, which 'in this context requires ... that the
means chosen do not "burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate
interests'" Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
662, 114 S.Ct. 2445, 129 LEd.2d 497 (1994) (quoting Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105
L.Ed.2d 661 (1989))." Corley, 273 F.3d at 450. Rational basis
scrutiny requires only that the government interest be
legitimate and that the means be rationally related to the
end. This is the easiest test for the government to pass.
Chief Justice Rehnquist explained the function of rational
basis scrutiny in assessing an alleged violation of equal
protection in Board of Trs. of Univ. ofAlabama v. Garrett, 531
U.S. 356, 367 (2001 ):"Moreover, the State need not articulate
its reasoning at the moment a particular decision is made.
Rather, the burden is upon the challenging party to negative
,any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide
a rational basis for the classification."' (quoting Heller v. Doe,
509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993)).
"The injunction issued under the California UTSA was at
issue in Bunner, and the DMCA in Corley.
11 It is beyond the scope of this article to consider more fully
the choices made by the courts in selecting the First
Amendment tests they apply and the manner in which they
applied their tests.
87 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P3d I, 12 (Cal.
2003) (emphasis added).
88 Leslie Jacobs makes a similar point with regard to
Supreme Court decisions:"The Court confuses the content-
based/content neutral and the content/viewpoint inquiries
both when stating and applying them.The Court frequently
describes the content-based/content neutral inquiry as
hinging on the presence of viewpoint discrimination.The
Court's often repeated test for content neutrality is 'whether
the government has adopted a regulation of speech because
of disagreement with the message it conveys" The Court
frequently acknowledges, however, that the content-based
category extends to subject matter distinctions." Leslie
Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-based/Content-neutral and
Content/viewpoint Determinations, 34 McGEOrGE L. REv. 595,
602-03 (2003).
" "This Court has held that the First Amendment's hostility
to content-based regulation extends not only to a restriction
on a particular viewpoint, but also to a prohibition of public
discussion of an entire topic. Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530,537 (1980);
accord Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (199 1) (statute restricting
speech about crime is content based)." Burson v. Freeman,
504 U.S. 191, 197 (1992) (plurality opinion).
"' Burson, 504 U.S. at 197.
91 Id.
92 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1994)
(internal citation omitted).
' In the following explanation of how to determine whether
a measure is content based, note the misleading use of the
phrase "content neutrality": "Our principal inquiry in
determining content neutrality is whether the government has
adopted a regulation of speech 'without reference to the
content of the regulated speech?" Madsen v.Women's
Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753,763 (1994) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S.
at 791) (emphasis added). Compare the proper question to
he Nevz am -1, ,
ask in determining whether a measure is viewpoint-based,
with the misleading use of the phrase "content based": "The
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech
cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in
particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.
The government's purpose is the controlling consideration."
Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added).
'4 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I I I FSupp.2d 294,
330 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (emphasis added)."The reason that
Congress enacted the anti-trafficking provision of the DMCA
had nothing to do with suppressing particular ideas of
computer programmers and everything to do with
functionality-with preventing people from circumventing
technological access control measures-just as laws
prohibiting the possession of burglar tools have nothing to
do with preventing people from expressing themselves by
accumulating what to them may be attractive assortments of
implements and everything to do with preventing burglaries.
Rather, it is focused squarely upon the effect of the
distribution of the functional capability that the code
provides." Id at 329.
9 5 See EugeneVolokh, Freedom of Speech and Intellectual
Property: Some Thoughts after Eldred, 44 Liquormart, and
Bartnicki, 40 HOUSTON L. REV. 697, 702-10 (2003) (arguing that
"while intellectual property speech restrictions are generally
viewpoint-neutral,they define the behavior they prohibit
based on its content").
96 DVD Copy Control Ass'n v. Bunner, 75 P.3d I, II (quoting
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994)).
17 See supra note 84.
91 "Trade secret law promotes the sharing of knowledge, and
the efficient operation of industry; it permits the individual
inventor to reap the rewards of his labor by contracting with
a company large enough to develop and exploit it." Bunner, 75
P.3d at 12 (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp. 416 U.S.
470, 493 (1974).
99 Id. at 13.
100 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S.
539, 558 (1985).
1o' Bunner, 75 P.3d at 12.
012 Id. (quoting Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los
Angeles, 993 P.2d 334, 377-78 (2000)) (emphasis added).
Bunner quotes a disturbing statement from Los Angeles
Alliance on "content neutrality":"'[L]iteral or absolute
content neutrality' is not necessary." Bunner, 75 P.3d at 10
(quoting Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los
Angeles, 993 P.2d 334, 368 (2000)). By this the court seems
to mean that a statute which took facial aim at the content
of expression might not be content based.
03 See generally Bunner, 75 R3d I (Cal. 2003).
SId. at 12 ("The fact that the preliminary injunction
identifies the prohibited speech by its content does not make
it content based").
05 Id.
106 Id. at II.
07 Id. at 12 (quoting San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 536 (1987)).
"A final element of the Bunner court's reasoning which is
puzzling is the claim that the injunction is not content based
because it aims to enforce the trial court's judgments in the
course of a protracted dispute. In this respect, the court
appears to be saying that once a court issues an order it may
subsequently have to enforce the order injunctively against a
recalcitrant party.That appears to be the reason that the
court quotes Madsen v.Women's Health Center, Inc., to the
effect that even though an injunction "regulates the activities,
and perhaps the speech:' of a particular group, it does so
"because of the group's past actions in the context of a
specific dispute between real parties." Bunner, 75 P.3d at 12
(quoting Madsen v.Women's Health Centers, Inc., 512 U.S.
753, 762 (1994)). Of course, in Bunner there was no prior
history of disagreement between the parties themselves; the
posting by Bunner and others of DeCSS was the only
violation alleged by the DVD CCA and this was the first time
they had brought Bunner to court. In this respect, the court's
suggestion that the parties had a history of litigation, when
they did not, only confirms its own awareness of the public
importance of the issue posed by the availability of DeCSS. It
may also be that the court's view that the purveyors of
DeCSS were attempting to steal what did not belong to
them led it to view the case as a continuation of the Napster
controversy, and thus an ongoing dispute previously
submitted for judicial resolution.
109 Bunner, 75 P.3d. at 13 (quoting Madsen, 512 U.S. at 765)
("Under the Madsen test,'when evaluating a content-neutral
injunction ... [w]e must ask ... whether the challenged
provisions of the injunction burden no more speech than
necessary to serve a significant governmental interest.")
10 The court tacitly adopted the intermediate level of
scrutiny by noting that it was adopting a lesser standard than
strict scrutiny. Bunner, 75 R3d at 13 (noting that in Bartnicki v.
Vopper, 532 U.S. 5 14,536 (200 1), five justices-two in
concurrence and three in dissent- "endorsed the
application of a lesser standard" than strict scrutiny "even
though the statute arguably prohibited 'pure speech"').
I IId. (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
493 (1974)).
"1
2 Id. (quoting RodneyA. Smolla, Information as Contraband:
The FirstAmendment and Liability for Trafficking in Speech, 96
Nw. U. L. REV. 1099, 1164 (2002)).
" Id. at 14.
114 Id.
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6 Just how onerous the burden is under intermediate
scrutiny, and what the government must do in order to carry
its burden, is itself a controversial subject.As justice Kennedy
noted, however, the burden remains with the government
and it is a serious burden. SeeTurner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FC.C., 512 U.S. 622, 664-67 (1994) (plurality opinion).
17 California Attorney General William Lockyer made an oral
argument in which he denounced defendant's behavior in
essence as piracy: "Calling Bunner a 'hacker" Lockyer told the
high courtThursday that DeCSS is nothing more than 'a
burglary tool' used by Bunner and others for'breaking,
entering and stealing:" See Mike McKee, California High Court
Hears Clash of Speech, Trade Secrets Law, Law.com, May 30,
2003, at http://www.law.com/jsp/
article.jsp?id- 1052440811375 (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
"I"A total of two questions were lobbed his way during his
10 minutes of oral arguments in San Francisco, and both
were softballs." Id. (last visited Feb. 25, 2004).
9As noted supra note 47, the court sought unpersuasively
to minimize the breadth of its decision by noting that Bunner
had challenged only the injunction and not the California
UTSA itself. Bunner, 75 P.3d at I I n.6. In its opening sentence
the opinion notes the relevance of the broader issue to the
case: "Today we resolve an apparent conflict between
California's trade secret law (Civ.Code, § 3426 et seq.) and
the free speech clauses of the United States and California
Constitutions." Id. at 6.
1
20
,,[Pjrohibiting the disclosure of trade secrets acquired by
improper means is the only way to preserve the property
interest created by trade secret law and its concomitant
ability to encourage invention." Id. atl 7.
121 "Communication does not lose constitutional protection
as 'speech' simply because it is expressed in the language of
computer code. Mathematical formulae and musical scores
are written in 'code,' i.e., symbolic notations not
comprehensible to the uninitiated, and yet both are covered
by the FirstAmendment." Corey, 273 F3d at 445-46. "If
someone chose to write a novel entirely in computer object
code by using strings of I's and O's for each letter of each
word, the resulting work would be no different for
constitutional purposes than if it had been written in
English." Id.
1 Id. at 454 (emphasis added).
'2' Formally, of course, the case was brought only under the
anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA, and any reference to
a challenge to the DMCA should be read most precisely as a
challenge to the anti-trafficking provisions. Even given the
attenuated scrutiny which the court accorded to the statute,
of course, the anti-trafficking provisions had to be assessed in
conjunction with the anti-circumvention provisions and in
light of the court's assessment of the purpose of the DMCA
in general.
124 Id. at 435.The Corley opinion leaves some room to think
that the Second Circuit might not uphold all future
challenges to the constitutionality of copyright and related
restrictions. It provides at least formal recognition that on
Corley's side is a "hacker community" which includes serious
scholars at one end and thieves on the other, a recognition
which may in the future introduce an element of difficulty to
the business of determining whether the defendant resides
on the right or the wrong end of the spectrum. At the same
time, the opinion subsequently establishes that Corley
resides toward the thieves' end of the spectrum, as it
explains the nature of the writings which appeared on
Corley's online magazine, 2600: "Representative articles
explain how to steal an Internet domain name and how to
break into the computer systems at Federal Express" Id. at
439.
12 Id. at 445 (citing Name.Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 202 F.3d 573, 584 n. I I (2d. Cir. 2000)).
126 Id. at 449-50. Before the constitutional analysis the court
considered and rejected the arguments that the DMCA
should be construed narrowly so as to avoid the
constitutional issues. Id. at 443-45.
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128 Id. at 450.
'19 "Content-based restrictions are permissible only if they
serve compelling state interests and do so by the least
restrictive means available .... A content-neutral restriction is
permissible only if it serves a substantial government interest,
the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression, and the regulation is narrowly tailored... :' Id. at
450 (citations omitted).
130 Id. at 451 (quoting Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 720
(2000)).
13 Id. at 450 (quotingWard v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 791 (1989)).
132 Id. at 450-52.
33 Id. at 451-52.
134 17 U.S.C.§ 1201(a)(1) (2003).
35 17 U.S.C.§ 1201(a)(2) (2003).
3'In the words of the Corley court:
Computer programs are not exempted
from the category of First Amendment
speech simply because their instructions
require use of a computer.A recipe is no
less 'speech' because it calls for the use of
an oven, and a musical score is no less
'speech' because it specifies performance
on an electric guitar. Arguably
distinguishing computer programs from
conventional language instructions is the
_ke
__ 0~
fact that programs are executable on a
computer. But the fact that a program has
the capacity to direct the functioning of a
computer does not mean that it lacks the
additional capacity to convey information,
and it is the conveying of information that
renders instructions 'speech' for
purposes of the First Amendment.The
information conveyed by most
'instructions' is how to perform a task.
Corley, 273 F3d at 447-48 (internal citations omitted).
137 Id. at 45 I.
138 Id.
139 Id.
14 Id. (quoting Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386
(I 969)).The opinion does not quote Red Lion for any point
regarding functionality, but for the proposition that
"[D]ifferences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to
them."
141 Id. at 454.
142 Id. at 45 I.
1
43 Id.
'44 Id. at 454.
141 Id.at 454 (citing Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S.at 662).
46 See General Docket for Second Circuit Court of Appeals
at 7, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, F3d 429 (2d Cir.
2001) (No. 00-9185) (New party added: Daniel S.Alter Esq.,
representingThe United States of America (Intervener)),
available at http://cryptome.org/mpaa-v-2600-ca2.txt (last
visited Feb. 21, 2004).
147 Corley, 273 F3d at 454 (emphasis added).
'48 The District Court opinion likewise treats the importance
of the government's interest as "evident": "The substantiality
of that interest is evident both from the fact that the
Constitution specifically empowers Congress to provide for
copyright protection... and from the significance to our
economy of trade in copyrighted materials.... Indeed, the
Supreme Court has made clear that copyright protection
itself is 'the engine of free expression"' Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I I I E Supp. 2d 294, 330 (S.D.N.Y.
2000).
149391 U.S. 367 (1968).
0s512 U.S. 622 (1994).
I"' "Thus, in applying O'Brien scrutiny we must ask first
whether the Government has adequately shown that the
economic health of local broadcasting is in genuine jeopardy
and in need of the protections afforded by must-carry." Id. at
664-65 (plurality opinion).
1"2 Id. at 665 (quoting Ward v. Rock against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 799 (1989)).
3 The Corley opinion notes that the Supreme Court has
expressed the tailoring requirement under this test in
various ways. Corley, 273 F3d at 450 n.25.
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4 Id. at 454 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
iss Id.
'16 Id. (emphasis added).
'S7As the defense brief requesting en banc review explained:
The panel stated 'the appellants have
not suggested, much less shown, any
technique for barring them from making
this instantaneous worldwide distribution
of a decryption code that makes a lesser
restriction on the code's speech
component.' Slip op. 7522. But to the
contrary, the Panel did receive substantial
argument and evidence describing an
array of means for preventing digital
copyright infringement without the
blunderbuss of banning decryption
programs altogether. See Opening Brief at
57-60. At oral argument the panel
requested and then later accepted even
more information from Appellants about
the alternatives that were available to
Congress to prevent digital copyright
infringement. See Supplemental Brief
atl 5-17; Order of May 30, 2001 allowing
exhibits in support of supplemental letter
brief.
Those less restrictive means included the
following:
I. Create explicit and enforceable
exceptions for circumvention and
circumvention tools for fair and
noninfringing uses. Opening Brief at 57-
58.
2. Restrict circumvention liability to
those who intentionally aid and abet
copyright infringement or who conspire
to infringe copyrights, following the path
taken by "burglars' tools" statutes. Reply
at 17-19;ACLU amicus brief at 19-22;
Supplemental brief at 16.
3. Limit liability to circumvention for
illegal purposes, as outlined in the
Boucher and Ashcroft bills, rather than
extend liability to tools makers and tools
disseminators. H.R. 3048, 105th Cong. § 8
(I 997) (Boucher); S. 1146, 105th Cong. tit.
III (1997) (Ashcroft). Opening brief at 58,
footnote 42; Supplemental Brief at 16.
4. Protect fair and non-infringing uses
the same way it protected ephemeral
recordings in the DMCA. 17 U.S.C.
§1 12(a)(2).There, Congress expressly
required copyright owners to "make
available to the transmitting organization
the necessary means" for making
ephemeral copies and authorized self-
help if such means are not made "timely"
available. Id. Congress could have done
the same for fair use: required that
copyright owners using technological
protection measures make copies of their
works available for fair or non-infringing
uses, allowing circumvention and the
dissemination of the circumvention means
should they fail to do so. Supplemental
brief at 16.
5. Follow the model of theVessel Hull
Design Protection Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1309,
passed as part of the legislative package
that contained § 120 1. Under that statute,
a disseminator of information is liable
only if he or she "induced or acted in
collusion with" one who actually gains
unauthorized access to a work. Opening
brief at 58, footnote 42; Supplemental
Brief at 16.
Appellants' Brief at 7, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley,
available at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVDcases/
20020114 ny_2600_appeal.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
"' There is much more on the purpose and function of
DeCSS in the Declarations attached to the Brief Submitted
by Media Defendant 2600 Enterprises, Inc., Reimerdes (No. 00
Civ. 277), available at http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/
MPAADVD cases/2000003_nydef-linkingjreply.htmt
(last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
"" Corley, 273 F.3d at 450-52.
6 See Declaration of Robin Gross in Opposition to Plaintiffs'
Motion to Modify the Preliminary Injunction and in Support
of Defendants' Cross-Motion to Vacate the Preliminary
Injunction, Brief Submitted by Media Defendant 2600
Enterprises, Inc., Reimerdes (No. 00 Civ. 277), available at
http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/MPAADVD-cases/
20000503_nydef-linkingreply.html (last visited Feb. 2 1,
2004)
6! See Declaration of Michael I. Shamos, Reimerdes (No. 00
Civ. 277), available at www.2600.com/dvd/docs/2000/0630-
shamos.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2004);Transcript of Trial-
Day I at 5 1, Reimerdes (No. 00 Civ. 277), available at http://
www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAADVD cases/
20000717_nytrial transcript.html (last visited Feb. 2 1,
2004).
That instance involved an experiment in which
Michael Shamos, a professor of computer science at
Carnegie Mellon and a lawyer by training, used DeCSS in
order to engineer a swap of DVDs with an anonymous
individual over the Internet.With the aid of an assistant who
also had expertise in computing, Shamos managed to swap
DVDs after spending a total of twenty hours on the project.
He estimated that the second time would take only ten
hours, a far cry from the instantaneous results which, as the
court supposed, could be accomplished by the mere click of
a mouse.
2464 U.S.417 (1984).
63 "Defendants claim also that the possibility that DeCSS
might be used for the purpose of gaining access to
copyrighted works in order to make fair use of those works
saves them under Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. But
they are mistaken. Sony does not apply to the activities with
which defendants here are charged. Even if it did, it would
not govern here." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,
I I I F.Supp.2d 294, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). "Sony involved a
construction of the Copyright Act that has been overruled
by the later enactment of the DMCA to the extent of any
inconsistency between Sony and the new statute" Id.
(footnote signal omitted). "Congress explicitly noted that
Section 1201 does not incorporate Sony." Id. at 324.
" ,The allowance of a First Amendment overbreadth
challenge to a statute is an exception to the traditional rule
that 'a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be
applied may not challenge that statute on the ground that it
may conceivably be applied unconstitutionally to others in
situations not before the Court." New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747,767 (1982). See alsoVirginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113
(2003); Board of Tr. of State Univ. of NewYork v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469,484 (1989).
6 Corley, 273 F.3d at 457-58.The court goes on to claim that
this dilemma presents a question of public policy appropriate
for Congressional resolution.
166 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
'1
7 Id. at 369.
168 Id. at 370.
69 Id. at 376-77.
170 Id. at 377-78.
'7 "The characterization of functionality as a proxy for the
consequences of use is accurate." Corley, 273 F3d at 45 1.
172 Id.
171 /d. at 452.
395 U.S. 444 (1969). See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral
Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46,47,47 n.4 ( 1987)(citing
Brandenburg as reviewing a content based restriction on
speech).
" Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 447.
176 Corley,273 F.3d at 452.
177 Id. at 451 (denying"that code is no different, for First
Amendment purposes, than blueprints that instruct an
engineer or recipes that instruct a cook.... Unlike a blueprint
or a recipe, which cannot yield any functional result without
human comprehension of its content, human decision-making,
and human action, computer code can instantly cause a
computer to accomplish tasks and instantly render the
results of those tasks available throughout the world via the
Internet").
Thus the court explained that its holding does not
depart from Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.artuli, 228
F.3d 94, III (2d Cir. 2000), in which the Second Circuit held
that a computer program named "Recurrence," a program
designed to advise the user on buying and selling currency
futures contracts, was not protected by the First
Amendment. Recurrence issued its advice in words but was
not protected because those words were actually
"commands," in accord with the way the product was
marketed:"Essential to our ruling in Vartuli was the manner in
which the defendants marketed the software and intended
that it be used: the defendants told users of the software to
follow the software's cues 'with no second-guessing: and
intended that users follow Recurrence's commands
'mechanically' and 'without the intercession of the mind or
the will of the recipient[.]" Corley,273 F3d at 449.
178 Id.
179 Id. (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, I I I
FSupp. 2d 294, 331-32 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
180,,As we said in Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98
(1961), 'the mere abstract teaching ... of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is
not the same as preparing a group for violent action and
steeling it to such action." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S.
444, 447-48 (1969).
